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Abstract—Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) are emerging as a
principal mechanism for managing the sharing of radio spectrum.
The design of the SAS depends on the specification of spectrum
property rights and the governance system by which those rights
are enforced. Current perspectives on SAS design have been too
limited, focusing narrowly on the technical components without
adequate consideration of socio-technical factors that will impact
the likely success of any SAS design.
In this paper, we apply the social science literature on the
management of common pool resources (CPR) to the design
challenge for the SAS. Heretofore, too much of the discussion has
focused on an overly simplistic characterization of the spectrum
rights design space as a dichotomous choice between licensed v.
unlicensed, markets v. government, and exclusive v. open. The
CPR framework forces consideration of a wider class of design
options, positioning the specifications of spectrum property rights
more appropriately along a multi-dimensional continuum of
rights bundles. The CPR framework highlights the importance
of considering formal and informal, multi-layered institutional
and market-based interactions among SAS stakeholders when
designing a resource management system. We will explain how
this leads one to view the SAS as a polycentric governance system
(using the terminology in the CPR literature). By examining the
economic and social context of spectrum sharing, we assert that
these emerging systems must be sufficiently flexible to adapt
to various forms of resource governance, which refers to the
process by which rights are distributed among stakeholders, how
those rights are enforced, and how the resource is managed. We
illustrate how the insights from the CPR literature might be
implemented in a prototype SAS architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
The PCAST report [1] concluded that the future of spectrum
management should be increased reliance on shared spectrum.
That means sharing in multiple ways and under diverse
regimes that will include licensed, unlicensed and other new
sharing models. A key component of the PCAST vision is
the development of a Federal Spectrum Access System (SAS)
to serve as an “information and control clearinghouse for the
band-by-band registrations and conditions for use” to “enable
flexible sharing of spectrum” in “collaboration with industry
partners.” Appropriately designed, the SAS will be a key
component of the spectrum management regime, helping to
match spectrum users with access rights (market-making) and
ensure appropriate interference protection (enforcement).
Indeed, at a meta level, the SAS may be viewed as the
evolutionary trajectory of spectrum management from the
legacy framework of static spectrum assignments toward a
dynamic, informative, and flexible management system that
allows spectrum resources to be shared on a much more
granular basis with respect to electrospace1. The frequency
allocation chart2 is commonly used to explain the challenges
of spectrum management reform by illustrating the confusion
of overlapping and fragmented block assignments to heteroge-
neous users and uses. This map and the spectrum management
regime it visually summarizes is static, uninformative, and
inflexible. It is hard to modify when technology, business,
or regulatory changes indicate that spectrum rights should
be shifted to new, higher-value uses. It is uninformative and
opaque in so far as the rights assignments are difficult to
discern and clarify even for active industry stakeholders. These
assignments are a hodgepodge of legacy and inconsistent rules
that lack clear documentation, making it difficult to reconcile
conflicting rights claims and thereby complicating all aspects
of spectrum management.
At the core of current proposals for the SAS is a database
system that has benefited significantly in terms of its design
from the advances made in developing a TV White Space
(TVWS) framework for sharing broadcast spectrum.3
To date, much of the effort on SAS design has focused
overly narrowly on the technical aspects of the system. This
is akin to designing an AI expert system without considering
the user and the environment in which the expert system will
be used as part of the system being designed. As we move
toward the implementation of these systems, we believe that
it is important to consider the range of social and institutional
approaches that may emerge to govern particular spectrum
sharing situations and ensure that SAS designs do not preclude
likely spectrum governance arrangements.
1DeVany [2] and Matheson [3], [4] have attempted to codify the technical
aspects of spectrum and have coined the term ‘electrospace’ to capture the
complex aspects of spectrum. In its simplest form, electrospace consists of a
3-tuple of time, frequency and physical space.
2See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2003-allochrt.pdf
3Weiss et al. [5] discuss the cost and other benefits of using database driven
systems in many kinds of spectrum sharing situations.
We begin by putting SASs into a theoretical perspective.
If SAS-based spectrum sharing systems achieve even a small
level of success, they promise to be an “infrastructure” as de-
fined by Bowker et al. [6] as a “pervasive enabling resource”.4
As such they are a technical embodiment of a particular set
of social agreements.
Thus, we may benefit from the science and technology
studies literature. Bowker et.al. [6] observe that “ ... in building
cyberinfrastructure, the key question is not whether a problem
is a ‘social’ problem or a ‘technical’ one. That is putting it the
wrong way around. The question is whether we choose, for
any given problem, a primarily social or a technical solution,
or some combination.” More broadly, we can approach SAS
design as a “configuration” [7] that joins both technological
and social considerations (i.e., “socio-technical”). Further,
there has been a relatively recent turn toward studies of large
scale infrastructures in society that may inform the design
of SASs [8], [9]. Indeed, the mechanisms for sharing radio
spectrum constitute a large technological system (LTS) that is
defined by its complexity, legacy, stakeholders, and its current
and future impact on society [10]. This literature makes clear
that the heterogeneous nature of infrastructures, including their
embeddedness in practice means that they cannot be separated
from how people use, act with, and enable them.
The contribution of this paper is to ground spectrum sharing
in general and SASs in particular in the socio-economic
literature. This will provide the foundation for sound policy
development and analysis going forward, enabling a systematic
framework for reasoning about stakeholders, their rights, the
enforcement of those rights, and the technologies that enable
the resulting policies.
II. SPECTRUM AS A COMMON POOL RESOURCE
Much of the debate over the economic and legal aspects
of spectrum management has focused on how the bundles of
property rights over spectrum should be defined, allocated,
and managed (which includes enforcement of interference
protection) so as to best maximize the social and economic
benefits from sharing our spectrum resources.5 The literature
on the management of Common Pool Resources (CPR) pro-
vides a useful framework for examining alternative options for
the design of spectrum rights bundles and their management
that explicitly forces joint consideration of the socio-technical
4Bowker et al. [6] define infrastructure to include all of the technology
and tangible elements (i.e., the machines, bricks & mortar, roads, etc.) as
well as the standards, business processes and other intangibles that together
help define how infrastructure is used and evolves. Viewed in this way,
infrastructure (like spectrum) may be viewed as a public resource that needs
to be managed so that it evolves to meet society’s needs.
5The early debate often characterized legacy spectrum management as
“Command & Control,” (C&C) which referred to centralized government
management of all aspects of spectrum usage. C&C evoked images of the
inefficiencies of Soviet-era central planning and was contrasted with more
efficient market-based approaches. The debate often focused on the relative
advantages of licensed v. unlicensed regimes, where licensed was equated with
private property and unlicensed with a “commons.” In truth, both of these
regimes are property rights regimes, just with rights defined and managed
differently.
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TYPES OF ECONOMIC GOODS
factors that impact how the resource should be governed in
specific contexts.6
Ostrom [11], a leading CPR scholar, argued that there
are four broad categories of economic goods that can be
differentiated as shown in Table I. Briefly, subtractability of
use is a term intended to capture whether one person’s use
of a good diminishes someone else’s ability to use the same
good. For example, most tangible goods (e.g. food) have high
subtractability of use since at most one person can consume it.
Public goods (e.g., national defense) have low subtractability
of use, since we all “consume” it without diminishing someone
else’s ability to consume it. Subtractability of use relates
to the extent to which a resource may be shared. Lower
subtractability of use implies expanded options for sharing.
As to the other dimension, much discussion of the economic
literature focuses on the ease of excluding people from the
consumption of a good. It is generally thought that excluding
someone from consuming national defense is difficult, since
when it is provided for anyone, it is provided for everyone.
Conversely, it is relatively easy to exclude people from the
consumption of tangible goods through the use of physical
barriers (e.g., locks, doors).7 Excludability, which is associated
with private goods, makes it feasible to decentralize resource
management through competitive markets.8
Table I juxtaposes these two dimensions to produce four
types of economic goods. The earlier model divided goods
into two types: private (e.g., food, tangible goods) and public
(e.g., national defense).9 Ostrom’s refinement added two new
categories: Toll goods and Common Pool goods. Toll goods
are represented by examples such as movie theaters and
limited access highways, where exclusion is relatively easy but
subtractability of use is low.10 Finally, common pool goods –
6Ostrom and other CPR scholars recognize that real resources are neither
strictly private nor public goods, but exist along a continuum, and that real
management regimes are more nuanced and not simply C&C, private property,
or open access commons.
7Ease of exclusion is clearly influenced by technology. The centuries old
“arms race” between thieves and locksmiths is but one example of this.
8Excludability enables resource owners to contract with consumers/users,
thereby enabling the resource to be priced and traded via markets. This forces
the resource owner to internalize the implications of decisions for the value of
the resource, and competition provides strong incentives to use the resource
efficiently. Demsetz [12] describes how resources evolve from common to
private goods as markets evolve.
9Samuelson’s 1954 [13] classification of goods divided the world into two
types: private and public, which were rival/excludable and non-rival/non-
excludable in consumption. Ostrom’s refinement into four categories recog-
nizes that subtractability (or rivalness) and excludability are not binary but a
question of degrees (varying from low to high, easy to difficult).
10Buchanan [14] characterized these as “club goods,” or goods which are
collectively owned and managed, like a golf club.
or, equivalently, common pool resources (CPRs) – are often
exemplified by natural resource systems (such as fisheries),
where exclusion is costly and subtractability (or congestion)
of use is present.
The economic characteristics of spectrum have been ex-
plored by other researchers. Herter [15] finds that “[u]nlike
hard minerals or petroleum, the electromagnetic spectrum is
not depletable; it is always available in infinite abundance
except for that portion which is being used. When that portion
of the electromagnetic spectrum is not in use, it is instantly
renewable ... [s]oils or forests are also renewable but frequently
at a price ... spectrum has been called a “limited” natural
resource because, given present technology, there is only a
finite portion available for beneficial uses at any one time.”
Shelansky and Huber [16] observe that “there is no such thing
as spectrum,” which is a provocative way of saying that “radio
is an invented good, which is highly dependent on technology.”
[17].
We concur with previous scholars [15], [17] and find that
spectrum best fits the “Common Pool” type of good because it
exhibits the properties of subtractability of use and difficulty
of exclusion under current technology. The physical properties
of spectrum give rise to the subtractability of use. When a
person emits energy into a particular piece of electrospace, it
raises the noise level for other possible users. Following the
Shannon-Hartley Theorem, an increase in noise decreases the
available channel capacity ceteris paribus. Thus, we conclude
that subtractability of use for spectrum is best classified as
being high for the purposes of Ostrom’s goods typology.11
As to the other dimension, we assert that it is relatively
difficult to exclude an arbitrary user from the use of most
regions of electrospace. WiFi access points may use passwords
and CMRS systems may use various forms of encryption
and access control built into the multiple access protocols,
but these only serve to exclude non-subscribers from using
their radio systems, not the spectrum. In the ISM bands, non-
WiFi devices (e.g., Bluetooth, Zigbee, cordless phones) can
compete with WiFi; likewise, cell phone and GPS jammers
are readily available for purchase (though not legally so in
many jurisdictions) in various bands and power levels. As well,
the emergence of inexpensive and widely available software
radios (e.g., GNU radios, USRPs) that can be programmed to
the user’s needs can emit radio energy over a wide range of
frequency bands (whether legal or not). Yet another example
of the difficulty of exclusion can be found in the jamming of
radio signals that was common during the Cold War [17].
We recognize that subtractability and excludability in spec-
trum are intimately connected with technology.12 For example,
the case can be made that ultrawideband (UWB) is practically
not subtractable because the loss in capacity is so small that
11Better radio technology and management frameworks expand the range
of sharing options, expanding options for co-existence among diverse systems
and users, and thus reduce subtractability of use.
12As we explain further below, technology works in concert with policy
and other factors in the ecosystem. For example, tight radio certification
requirements coupled with strong enforcement make it easier to exclude,
regardless of the state of radio technology.
it may not be measurable; and smart antenna technology
allows for spatial multiplexing that could make subtractability
insignificant. Similarly, excludability depends on the cost and
efficacy of detection, identification and enforcement tech-
niques and technologies. Highly effective and inexpensive
enforcement approaches could result in de facto excludability
even if this is not so in the abstract. The fact that radio
technologies and other factors of the radio ecosystem may
evolve suggests that it is best to view spectrum as a CPR,
where the extent of excludability and subtractability of use
may vary with a host of factors in the ecosystem (not just,
technology) and may be responsive to the design of the
spectrum management regime.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR SPECTRUM GOVERNANCE
Broadly speaking, spectrum sharing involves a redistribution
of rights among an enlarged group of stakeholders [18].13
This points in general to a need for revised governance,
which refers to “any mode of co-ordination of interdependent
activities” [20]. This coordination includes the (dynamic)
distribution of rights among stakeholders and mechanisms for
enforcing those rights [11], [21], [22].
Much of the debate over spectrum management has focused
on whether spectrum should be treated more like private
property, governed by exclusive-use licenses where sharing
options may be limited by the licensee; or as an unlicensed
commons, where access is open [23], [24]. With a commons,
there is the risk that aggregate usage will be excessive since
individual users may fail to take into account the adverse
effects of their usage on others (i.e., subtractability of use);
and because users cannot be excluded, a Tragedy of the
Commons may result. We follow Lehr [25] in claiming that
the dichotomy between exclusive use and commons is a false
one. With private property, there is a risk of inefficient (or non-
existent) markets precluding efficient resource assignments.14
Moreover, Smith [27], Ostrom [11], Fennell [28] and others
(e.g., [29]) argue that many options for governing common
pool resources, such as spectrum, exist that successfully avoid
the “tragedy of the commons”.
A. Common pool resources and governance
CPR scholars have shown that common pool resources are
amenable to a range of governance approaches [11], [22], [30].
The earlier literature that classified goods as private or public
equated private goods with (decentralized) market governance
and public goods with (centralized) state governance, as if
the choice were binary. CPR scholars recognized that this did
not fit many resource cases well and that the best governance
13Agrawal and Ostrom [19] note that “decentralization is also synonymous
with redistribution of power, resources, and administrative capacities through
different territorial units of a government and across local groups. Thus,
decentralization can be seen as a strategy of governance, prompted by external
or domestic pressures to facilitate transfers of power closer to those who are
most affected by the exercise of power.”
14Excludability and the other features that give rise to efficient markets (e.g.,
liquid supply and demand, low transaction costs, etc.) cannot be presumed
to simply exist [26]. The CPR framework emphasizes the extent to which
excludability and subtractability in use exist on a continuum.
systems are typically polycentric, which means that there are
multiple centers of decision-making control or influence that
may partially overlap in scope or hierarchy and interact with
each other in complex ways that evolve over time.
Thus, contrary to the predictions of earlier theory, in an-
alyzing the municipal governance of police, water and other
public good resources, CPR scholars found that there were
benefits from a polycentric approach, but the precise factors
that predict what works best are context dependent [11].15 For
example, when the numbers of resource users are small, then
an open commons type of governance structure, in which users
own the resource collectively, may work best; whereas when
the numbers of resource users gets large, mechanisms that
are closer to more traditional private property rights regimes
may be needed. For intermediate cases, polycentric governance
may be most appropriate. In this last form of governance,
stakeholders distribute the rights amongst themselves and de-
velop decentralized approaches to enforce that rights structure.
This is often a dynamic structure because technology, resource
characteristics, resource demand, etc. may change over time.
Another outcome of the CPR literature is a more nuanced
notion of property rights. Classifying users into different broad
types according to their role in resource governance and
use has proven helpful in understanding polycentric resource
governance since a heterogeneity of rights holders exists.
More broadly, it has led to a recognition that the notion of
“property rights” actually refers to a bundle of rights. For many
natural resources, Schlager and Ostrom [30] proposed the
rights structure in Table II.16 The first two rights (i.e., Access
and Withdrawal) can be considered usage rights which relate
to the operation of the resource system, while the remaining
three are referred to as collective action rights, which refer
to the design of the rights system.17 In Table II, there is a
natural hierarchy of possible stakeholders with those with the
least rights being “entrants” and those with more collective
action rights having more decision-making control.
As argued in [18], the bundles of rights in spectrum depend
on the usage paradigm. In the exclusive use paradigm, the
use and collective action rights are assigned to the license
holders. The license holders are therefore viewed as “Full
Owners.” Access rights (i.e., the right to receive) depends
on the application type – in broadcasting, we may have
“Authorized Entrants” who have receive but not transmit
rights. As spectrum sharing is introduced, we add a class of
15Earlier predictions were that to the extent that public goods aspects
of such resources as police, water, or fisheries dictated a need for state
control, such control should be centralized to avoid duplication of authority.
In contrast, case studies of real world police forces, water management, or
fishery management systems have found that a mix of decentralized control
allocated to local users, with some agency for centralized control often works
better in practice. Such systems are more flexible and adaptive, and better
able to adjust to differences in local circumstances.
16These notions have been generally applied to international spectrum
assignment [17] albeit not at the same level of granularity.
17Management rights refer to the design of the rights by which the resource
is used and managed; whereas Exclusion rights refer to the design of the rights
as to who has access to the resource. The Alienation rights refer to the rights
to transfer any of the other rights.
Full Prop- Auth. Auth. Auth.
owner rietor claimant user entrant
Access X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS BY USER TYPE
“Authorized Users” as well. These users may be authorized by
the government or through explicit consent (the “participation”
scale in Figure 4). If it is through consent, the “Authorized
Users” may be better classified as “Authorized Claimants”
since they may have some collective action rights.
We can contrast this with the ISM bands, which use an
open access governance paradigm. Here, most collective action
rights are effectively held by a licensing authority or govern-
ment and the access (receive) and withdrawal (transmit) rights
are shared equally by all users. As we explain further below,
even in such circumstances, governance may be feasible.
B. Spectrum governance
The literature has paid considerable attention to the virtues
of both commons as well as property-based approaches to
spectrum governance. In contrast, relatively little attention
has been paid to the possibility of polycentric governance of
spectrum, although two studies address this in particular [17],
[31].
To illustrate this point, consider different approaches to the
de facto governance of WiFi bands. Figure 1 shows channel
usage in a condominium complex. In this complex, each owner
installs and maintains their own WiFi system, which results
in considerable contention for the available channels. That
is, governance is “open access” and spectrum users do not
coordinate with each other. But other forms of governance
are possible. For example, the channel usage in figure 2 is
from a condominium complex where WiFi is provided by the
association. This results in a more managed user experience
despite being situated near other condominium complexes. The
result is similar to what might be found in a hotel (Figure 3),
where the ISM bands are (mostly) governed by the property
owner. What these examples illustrate are the technical benefits
from coordinated governance of the unlicensed access points
when congestion becomes an issue.
Note that the “governance” of unlicensed bands is subject
to significant limitations in the US [18]. The recent case
involving Marriott [32] illustrates the problem: was Marriott
blocking other WiFi access points to provide a better expe-
rience for users on its premises or unfairly discriminating
against non-affiliated access points (for profit)? The FCC’s
OTARD rules [33] significantly limit the ability to manage
this shared resource, whether through the lens of Ostrom or
Coase. However, in the presence of congestion, more flexible
Fig. 1. WiFi channel occupancy in an unmanaged condominium complex
Fig. 2. WiFi channel occupancy in a managed condominium complex
spectrum governance should be able to enhance the experience
for all users.
Spectrum sharing introduces new bundles of rights that
vary with the sharing model. Figure 4 highlights three di-
mensions along which sharing may be differentiated: coop-
eration/coordination, hierarchy and participation. The coop-
eration/coordination dimension refers to the way in which
sharing is achieved between a primary license holder and
the spectrum entrant (primary/secondary users). Cooperative
sharing involves explicit coordination between the sharing
parties; whereas non-cooperative sharing is equivalent to op-
portunistic sharing (i.e., the secondary user may only use the
spectrum in so far as such use does not interfere with the
primary user). The hierarchy dimension refers to the extent to
which there are multiple tiers of rights holders with different
Fig. 3. WiFi channel occupancy in a hotel
Fig. 4. Typology of spectrum sharing
levels of priority, and within each tier, multiple holders with
symmetric rights. For example, in the exclusively licensed
PCS bands, the cellular licensee has primary access rights.
UWB users operate as secondary users in the noise floor in
bands they share, while TVWS devices must avoid interfering
with TV broadcasters. Typically, entrants are thought to have
secondary rights to incumbents; but that is a matter of policy
choice.18 Finally, the participation dimension refers to the
extent to which radio operators voluntarily agree to share
spectrum. Low participation implies a de jure spectrum sharing
obligation that requires the operators to share.
In this framing, TVWS is a case of low participation
(because the right to share broadcast spectrum is mandated
by the FCC), high cooperation (because sharing is mediated
by a database), and high hierarchy (since TVWS devices
operate as secondary to TV broadcasters). By way of contrast,
Cognitive Radio (CR) sharing is also low participation and
high hierarchy, but is low coordination since individual CR
radios are assumed to adapt their behavior without requiring
explicit coordination or cooperation from the primary incum-
bent systems. Wi-Fi WLANs are high participation (because
radio operators need to voluntarily agree to share the spectrum
since neither the existing technology or regulations provide
coordination mechanisms (so low cooperation/coordination),
and low hierarchy since all Wi-Fi radios have same level of
priority.19
18For example, public safety might be given “lights & siren” priority access
rights to a new band.
19Wi-Fi does have limited technical support for cooperative sharing. For
example, during initial start-up, Wi-Fi radios attempt to select an unoccupied
channel. Unfortunately, having selected a channel, Wi-Fi radios may not re-
optimize their channel selection when other access points come on line. Wi-Fi
radios also lack the ability to adjust their power-levels to better accommodate
additional access points.
C. Polycentric governance of spectrum
Wormbs [31] examined European broadcasting in the 1920s
from the perspective of CPR governance. She showed that
the international radio coordination efforts could be mapped
to Ostrom’s factors of successful polycentric governance.
In this case, sanctions for violating the agreed upon rules
worked effectively through the mechanism of “regulation by
information.” [34]
Wormbs argues that the “logic of demand and supply has
formed the present discourse on how to use the radio spectrum,
which in turn might limit our understanding of how this
resource can be efficiently used.” Note that her analysis was
performed in an era when technology was relatively static.20
Today’s context is characterized by rapid changes in technical
capability and cost. These changes may lead us to intriguing
possibilities for the future of wireless networks.
A more comprehensive view of the futures for wireless
networks that have been proposed would be beyond the scope
of this paper, though it might be useful to briefly consider
one. Doyle et al. [35] articulate a future wireless environment
where service providers assemble the resources they need
from the resource owners through the mechanism of spectrum
virtualization. Such a future would have to define a new mode
of sharing (high participation and cooperation with clearly
defined rights relationships) and novel arrangements of rights,
which could benefit from polycentric governance of wireless
resources.21 While considerable research and development is
needed to make such a vision a reality, it seems reasonable
to work to ensure that SAS designs that are being developed
today should not preclude these kinds of rights distributions
or governance arrangements.
Agrawal [22] reviews the CPR literature and summarizes
the factors that enable sustainable and efficient polycentric
governance. As noted, CPR scholars conclude that a wide
range of factors need to be considered and these are not easily
reduced to a simple set of requirements and recommendations.
The right framework depends on a number of factors. Agrawal
collected the facilitating conditions of successful, sustainable
decentralized governance systems of common pool resources
described by the leading CPR scholars. These are summarized
in Table III. Agrawal makes it clear that it is not necessary
for all of these conditions to hold for successful decentralized
governance to exist.
With this background in mind, let us explore when poly-
centric governance of spectrum might be possible. While this
is an empirical question in the end, we can make some
qualitative assessments. To do so, let us consider the categories
from Table III. Of these, the first three define the domain
20Interestingly, Wormbs shows the powerful effect of the change in receiver
technology (crystal radios to vacuum tube sets) on perceived interference. This
shows how technology can change the outcomes of governance decisions even
when resource allocation strategies are relatively static.
21Policymakers have discussed alternative models for dividing electrospace
into bundles of Spectrum Usage Rights that could be coordinated, prioritized,
and traded voluntarily on spectrum exchanges. For a discussion of vision of
Spectrum Usage rights, see [36]–[38]
Category Characteristic
Resource system 1. Small size
characteristics 2. Well-defined boundaries
Group characteristics 3. Small size
4. Clearly defined boundaries
5. Shared norms
6. Social capital
7. Appropriate leadership
8. Interdependence among members
9. Heterogeneity of endowments
10. Homogeneity of interests
Relationship betw. resource 11. User & resource location overlap
& group characteristics 12. High dependence on resource
13. Fairness in allocation of benefits
Institutional arrangements 14. Simple & easy to understand rules
15. Locally devised access & mgt rules
16. Ease in enforcement of rules
17. Graduated sanctions
18. Availability of low-cost adjudication
19. Accountability of monitors to users
Relationship betw. resource 20. Harvest rules match resource
& institutional arrangements regeneration
External environment 21. Low-cost exclusion technology
22. Central govts support local authority
23. Supportive external sanctioning insts
Nested levels of
appropriation, provision,
enforcement, governance
TABLE III
FACILITATING CONDITIONS FOR CPR GOVERNANCE
of applicability (i.e., frequency bands, geographic area) and
the remaining four are pertinent to technical and institutional
design choices in SAS systems. The literature in infrastruc-
ture studies (e.g., [6]) makes it clear that these choices are
intimately linked. These design choices will be the focus of
the subsequent sections of this paper.
1) Resource system characteristics: In the case of spec-
trum, there are multiple ways one might define the resource.
De Vany [2] and Matheson [3], [4] . This is partly the case
because the received signal strength of electromagnetic signals
varies randomly.22
The other characteristic of relevance is “small size.” This
is difficult to assess as it depends on the application and the
frequency band in question in addition to technical parameters
such as antenna type and height as well as transmit power level
and receiver sensitivity. That said, in the frequencies of interest
to CMRS, the standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
may be considered small enough. For the ISM bands, small
size almost certainly applies. In the AM radio band at night,
it would be difficult to make the case for “small size” as long
range propagation is typical.
2) Group characteristics: According to CPR research, suc-
cessful polycentric governance is most likely to be successful
when the size of the group is small, when the boundaries of
the resource are well defined, when there are favorable social
conditions (e.g., shared norms, social capital, etc.) and when
22This is clearly dependent on the frequency band in question, as some
bands may be subject to Rayleigh fading (for example) and others may not.
Measurement based propagation models have been successful at determining
the expected value of received signal strength in many bands.
the group members are interdependent with a heterogeneity of
endowments and a homogeneity of interests. As with resource
system characteristic, much of this depends on the particulars
of sharing. However, we can make some observations that
apply in general.
In spectrum sharing cases of interest, that is, those that
do not involve very sparse user populations where demand
for spectrum access is lower than supply, it can be said
that group members are interdependent on one another since
sharing responsibly means managing mutual co-channel and
adjacent channel interference. While resource boundaries are
not necessarily well defined, in many proposed cases they
overlap with population boundaries, that is, neighborhoods and
towns.
Moving on to some particular cases, let us first consider
the case of Federal-commercial sharing in the 1695-1710MHz
band. The group is small in each locality. The relevant bound-
aries are defined by exclusion zones. The group members
are interdependent in the sense that mutual interference is
possible. At this point, there is little or no social capital
because spectrum sharing is new. Over time, this would likely
change. In the 3.5GHz band, the relevant group is potentially
larger because of the presence of GAA users. This would make
polycentric governance of the resource as a whole unlikely.
However, at the proposed power levels for GAA, the signal
would not propagate far so that meaningful neighborhood level
governance of GAA bands could succeed, just as it can in the
case of WiFi in condominium complexes.
3) Relationship between resource and group characteris-
tics: [22] reminds us that critical factors for successful
polycentric governance of CPRs must consider not just the
group and resource characteristics but also the relationship
between the two. For example, studies have pointed out that
successful cases of polycentric governance occur when users
are highly dependent on the resource and when there is a
overlap between the user group and the resource. Finally, there
should be a perception on the part of group members that the
benefits of the resource are allocated fairly.
For many frequency bands, spectrum use is predominantly
a local affair.23 Indeed, cellular network architectures have
exploited this fact to increase system capacity through spatial
frequency re-use. Thus, the area of interest in sharing, say,
in the 1695-1710MHz band is the region near the boundaries
of the exclusion zones. The user groups (spectrum incumbent
and entrants) are both dependent on this resource and their
resources (cell sites, earth stations, etc.) overlap the resource
boundary.
4) Institutional arrangements: Institutional arrangements
refer to the social and legal frameworks within which CPR
governance exists. Williamson [21] summarizes these from the
point of view of institutional economics. Agrawal summarizes
the key factors for successful polycentric governance to be
simple and easy to understand rules, locally devised access
23While some frequencies can propagate large distances, many of commer-
cial interest are limited to line-of-sight (LoS) propagation modes.
and management rules, ease in enforcement of rules, grad-
uated sanctions, availability of low-cost adjudication, and the
accountability of monitors to users. Sanctions refer to penalties
for violation of the rules and the monitors are the people or
entities who are involved in the enforcement of the rules. Note
that the monitors may be the users themselves or a third party.
This category of factors focuses on access and enforcement
rules. Schlager and Ostrom [39] argued that different types of
users have different roles in the governance of a CPR system,
which they codified in Table II.
The distribution of rights depends on the mode of sharing.
Sharing modes that rank high on the hierarchy scale (see
Figure 4) would have fewer collective action rights granted
to spectrum entrants than those that are low on this scale
(i.e., which are more peer-to-peer). Similarly, we would ex-
pect greater reluctance to negotiate rights distribution when
participation is low (i.e., under de jure sharing). This would
suggest institutional designs to foster social capital and protect
the positions of more poorly situated participants.24
This category speaks to the need for ex post enforcement
as part of a broader enforcement strategy, which has also
been argued in [40]. Cost effectiveness, transparency, ease of
enforcement and graduated sanctions are important. Graduated
sanctions imply flexibility in responding to rule violations.
Doing so cost effectively remains a challenge. In the domain
of spectrum, this might call for a kind of sensor network to
support ex post adjudication [41].
In the end, CPR research suggests that local determinations
of rights, rules and enforcement should be possible for efficient
resource management. The definition of “local” is arbitrary
and depends on what makes sense from the resource and user
point-of-view rather than being determined by a distant central
authority.25
5) Relationship between resource and institutional arrange-
ments: The institutional rules discussed above do not exist
independently of the resource being governed. In fact, the
CPR literature suggests that a close match exists between the
resource rules and the associated institutional arrangements.
Polycentric governance also demands attention to sustainable
resource management. Since spectrum is infinitely renewable,
sustainable resource management means that the kind of stew-
ardship required of, say, a fishery or forest is not necessary.
Having said that, numerous industry observers have noted
the threat posed by the generally higher noise environment
facing wireless systems today. This increased noise is due
to many factors, including the increased distribution and use
of electrical devices, many processor-based devices (including
MP3 players, tablets, etc. as well as devices with embedded
processors) that radiate small amounts of electromagnetic
24These might be spectrum entrants, but they could just as well be weaker
primary users. In the case of the 1695-1710MHz band, the argument could
be made that the spectrum entrants (CMRS operators) were positioned more
strongly than the license holder (NOAA).
25Local is italicized because it is not limited to spatial (geographic)
dimensions. It may also refer to nearness in time, technology, usage, or some
other characteristic of the sharing context.
energy, imperfect and out-of-calibration filters on communica-
tions devices, etc. These devices conspire to reduce the useful
capacity of radio spectrum, so some kind of general resource
stewardship may be desirable.
6) External environment: Agrawal [22] suggests an array
of external factors, such as the availability of low-cost ex-
clusion technology. He, like Williamson [21], emphasizes the
importance of a broader institutional context. In the case of
CPR, it is important to have support from central governments
for the local governance authority, and that supportive external
sanctioning institutions, especially for enforcement, to exist.
7) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement
and governance: Ostrom [11] indicates that a local polycentric
governance framework can exist as part of a nested governance
system. This allows for coordination and governance at various
scales. For spectrum, this suggests that explicit institutional
governance relationships exist. The US has long had a multi-
level system of communications regulation [42] which could
be viewed in this manner. In spectrum, the FCC has delegated
governance authority to the amateur radio community for its
bands [18]. Applying this to spectrum sharing, let us consider
the 1675-1710MHz bands. The NOAA earth stations in Miami
and Honolulu have terrain and population profiles that are quite
different from one another [43]. Thus it seems reasonable
to imagine that a local approach to spectrum sharing could
emerge that is specific to the local circumstances.
Many of the proposals for SAS already anticipate the desir-
ability of this feature in their designs.26. These are reflected
in the FCC’s Report and Order and Further NPRM on the
3.5GHz band [44].
This nesting may also extend internationally. The ITU-
R serves to allocate spectrum use among countries. Simi-
larly, spectrum coordination takes place among the member
countries of the European Union. Further, regions near na-
tional borders may require specific bi-lateral spectrum sharing
agreements. Thus, local governance of spectrum resources
exists in a rich context of national and international spectrum
governance arrangements.
IV. SASS AND SPECTRUM GOVERNANCE OPTIONS
Many of the emergent forms of spectrum access will rely on
the use of database-driven Spectrum Access Systems (SASs).
While there is no consensus as yet on the design or structure
of such systems, we will use the one from the Finnish LSA
trial [45] as a working model, reproduced in Figure 5, since
it has been demonstrated to work in actual practice. Note that
other models are emerging as well (see, for example, Marshall
[46] and Sohul et.al. [47]).
When a spectrum entrant wishes to transmit, it queries
the LSA/ASA controller. This controller decides whether or
not to permit the entrant’s transmission based on a database,
the LSA/ASA license framework, which is populated and
maintained jointly by the regulator and the incumbent.
26See, for example the presentation of the FCC SAS workshop, at http:
//www.fcc.gov/events/35-ghz-spectrum-access-system-workshop
Fig. 5. Prototype SAS (from [45])
We note that this implementation embodies a particular
rights distribution and governance structure. However, it is
not clear what governance procedures for this database are.
For example, we do not know what the particular rights
of each party are and how they collaborate to determine
the contents of the database. Also unspecified are dispute
resolution mechanisms and procedures for revising the content
of the database.
From the point of view of polycentric governance, it is
difficult to see how that this architecture allows for meaningful
governance of the resource system, which, in this case, is the
licensed spectrum to be shared. The spectrum entrant is weakly
situated politically and technically as the only way to influence
the spectrum sharing operations is to influence the regulator.
There are theories of regulation (e.g., the “capture theory”) that
would suggest that the entrant would find it difficult or impos-
sible to engage in meaningful governance of this resource.27
Furthermore, there is no mechanism for accountability built in
to the framework, which makes enforcement of the spectrum
sharing framework difficult (e.g., is spectrum being shared as
intended?).
Applying Agrawal’s framework (Table III), we focus on
characteristics related to institutional arrangements, since that
is the locus of governance. These characteristics require trans-
parency of the rules: Are they simple and easy to understand
(#14)? Are the rules locally devised (#15)?). Perhaps the
regulator in the prototype SAS publishes the rules, however in
a potentially dynamic environment, it is difficult to make the
case that published rules would be current or useful. Another
group of characteristics focus on enforcement: Is it easy to
27A discussion of theories of regulation is outside the scope of this paper.
See [48] or [49] for surveys.
enforce the rules (#16)? Are sanctions for violations graduated
(#17)? Is adjudication low cost (#18)?). To the extent that
access is strictly controlled by the SAS, it would be fair
to say that enforcement is easy. However, if the entrant’s
radios violate the rules and thus encroach on the incumbent’s
electrospace, it is unclear how the system would respond.
If it is by withdrawing the license, it is hard to say that
the sanctions are graduated. What recourse do entrants have
to such action? Appealing to the regulatory agency is not,
generally speaking, a low cost adjudication approach. Finally,
the table suggests that accountability of the “monitors” – that
is, the entities enforcing the rules – is important (#19). Outside
of the vector of the regulatory agency, it is hard to find a
mechanism for accountability in Figure 5.
Outside of the institutional arrangements, the CPR literature
suggests a perception of fairness in allocation of benefits (#13).
If the spectrum entrants do not have some collective action
rights (e.g., a management right), then it may be difficult to
sustain an argument that benefits are being fairly distributed.
If polycentric governance of shared spectrum is to be
enabled, the prototype architecture of the SAS could be
modified as shown in Figure 6. Note that the technical aspect
of operation does not change in a significant way; this system
is now situated to reflect a range of possible social and
institutional contexts. This architecture adds the following:
• A governance process that feeds the SAS repository that
controls how actions are taken.
• A database that records the decisions of the controller.
This database serves as feedback to the governance
process so that the rules for access and use can be updated
based on past experience. It also enables accountability,
which supports the governance process and can help build
social capital. It also provides statistical data to spectrum
entrants that they can use in their decision process.
• New stakeholders and participants in the governance
process. It is not required that all participate, nor is this
list necessarily complete. We propose that this list is
suggestive of how to design a SAS that could support
polycentric governance. The participants are:
– Incumbents These are the license holders, as included
in Figure 5.
– Regulator This was included in Figure 5.
– Spectrum Entrants The entities that will share the
spectrum now have a voice in determining the access
rules and observing the operation of the SAS.
– The Public/NGOs For the purposes of accountability,
there will be a role for public participation in the
governance process. This might end up being NGOs
because of the technical nature of spectrum gover-
nance.
– Regional coordination Given that polycentric gover-
nance may be nested levels, an ability for regional
or higher layer coordination must be included.
– SAS providers SAS providers are a stakeholder that
should have a voice in the governance process.
Fig. 6. Modified prototype SAS
– Government Here, the government refers to the pol-
icy/political aspect of government rather than the
operational aspect represented by the regulator.
This modified design would not change the resource or
group characteristics. These changes would facilitate a dy-
namic sense of fairness among the stakeholders as well as
accountability of the implementors (SAS Operators) to the
stakeholders. Thus, it addresses some of the limitations of
the initial architecture with regard to possible polycentric
governance of the spectrum. We reiterate that such a revision
does not require polycentric governance, it merely enables it
where it makes sense.
Note that the “governance process” is deliberately not
clearly defined. This is not an oversight, since it depends on
which collective action rights are assigned to which groups,
and what decision-making process is agreed upon by the
groups. These determinations depend heavily on the particulars
of the sharing arrangement.
To make this more concrete, let us consider an LSA/ASA
approach as proposed for the 3.5GHz band in the US. This
band envisions a hierarchy of rights such that the incumbent,
US military radars, hold superior usage rights over the Priority
Access (PA) users, both of whom have superior usage rights
over the General Authorized Access (GAA) users.28 This
usage rights structure was determined ex ante.
Note that the usage rights hierarchy does not necessarily
mean that collective action rights follow the same hierarchy.
In fact, the CSMAC and FCC processes for the 3.5GHz bands
are, in fact, shared governance in that the rules for access
(management rights) and exclusion (exclusion rights) are being
worked out in a multi-stakeholder group that includes repre-
sentatives from the FCC (the independent regulatory authority
for commercial spectrum users), other government agencies,
industry stakeholders, and representatives from academia and
other interested groups.
Polycentric governance suggests that the rules be devel-
oped locally as part of a broader system (nested levels of
governance, from Table III). For the 3.5GHz band, this could
also make sense. For example, in regions where there are no
military radars they assert no usage rights, so this becomes
a two level usage rights regime, since the absence of usage
rights could suggest limited (if any) collective action rights.
Furthermore, the varying topography of the coastal regions
suggests that highly localized adaption of usage rights might
be practical.
The 3.5GHz case makes accountability (#19 in Table III)
more challenging, since the military often requires a measure
of confidentiality for their operations. GAA and PA users
would need a way to ensure that the rules were being enforced
so that lower priority users would be confident that their access
is not to be blocked without a justification grounded in the
ex ante rules (e.g., for political reasons), which is to say to
promote fairness (#13). Given the sensitivities of the data, the
governance process would have to be used to find a suitable
solution to this dilemma.
We assert that the governance process itself is part of
the infrastructural development of providing access to radio
spectrum. As we have seen, SASs are technology in the
making, and have yet to become settled [50]. Because SAS
will be built upon an installed base of a static, legacy system,
and because it embodies a variety of standards (and some-
times conflicting conventions), it carries with it a need for
combinatory approaches to governance [9], [51]. We offer a
combinatory approach to the socio-technical aspects of design,
primarily through polycentric approaches to governance. As
mentioned earlier, we propose employing a social-technical
perspective to the development of SAS governance through a
polycentric perspective. By adding elements to the modified
SAS prototype from [31] (entrants, public accountability,
regional coordination, and architecture providers) we aim to
yoke socio-technical elements to the technological momentum
of infrastructural development of SAS [50].
28It should be noted that this prioritization is a matter of policy choice, and
may change in the future. Commercial licensees, once granted PA licenses,
will expect to have interference protection from both incumbent, GAA, and
other PA licensees in the future. Expectations of what rights imply will evolve
with the market and technology, and the policy framework needs to be flexible
to adapt.
V. SAS AS AN EXERCISE IN POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE
Much of the prior discussion has focused on how the
different factors that arise in the design of CPR governance
would apply to the design of a SAS. It is also important to
understand the SAS as an exercise in polycentric governance.
The challenge confronting spectrum managers is to effect a
wholesale transformation of the management paradigm from
a status quo that is static, inflexible, and uninformative to
one that is dynamic, flexible, and informative; to complete the
transition from a legacy regime based on centralized C&C to
one that is more market-based (while recognizing that means
different things to different groups of stakeholders). The more
distributed, multidimensional design of polycentric governance
systems will assist in making this transition. This implies
having multiple SAS that may be integrated and interoperate
(to whatever extent is needed) more closely over time as
collective learning accrues. Having multiple SAS databases
(for different bands, administered by different entities, with
possibly partially over-lapping jurisdictions) may facilitate the
experiments in collective learning. Best practice designs may
emerge over time.
More directly, the ability of the SAS to embrace dynamic
rights assignments as a core goal will enable the SAS to
serve as a platform for evolving rights assignments, where the
evolution may occur at multiple time scales and along multiple
dimensions. For example, the technology of the SAS should be
amenable to upgrading of exclusion zone modeling techniques
and capable of taking advantage of sensor information as such
infrastructures evolve and enable more real-time management
of the spectrum. While today’s regulatory community is fo-
cused on expanding spectrum access for commercial mobile
broadband services, tomorrow’s challenges may be different
and the SAS ought to be able to adjust to those new needs
more flexibly.
Finally, the SAS will be a core component of the polycentric
enforcement apparatus that will make whatever rights regime
we adopt credible and effective. The SAS will accomplish
this goal in multiple ways. It will provide an audit trail and
repository for learning about spectrum usage that will be
important for identifying sharing opportunities and constraints.
It will provide a framework for managing the transition of new
rules and regulations on a granular basis. Precisely how the
SAS will accomplish these goals are important details that still
need to be worked out, but having an appropriate vision for
the SAS is an important starting point.
A. Implementation Considerations
The previous discussion provides relatively little specific
guidance to builders of SASs. Space does not permit an
exhaustive discussion of this and will therefore be a topic for
a future paper. However, we can discuss this in general:
• There are process oriented aspects of polycentric gov-
ernance, such as the determination and distribution of
rights, that are of great importance to stakeholders and
that may best be implemented through an API to a pro-
grammable policy engine. Similarly, the results database
that is useful for accountability and statistical characteri-
zation of the sharing environment would benefit from an
API. However, there are some possible national security
concerns and competitive intelligence concerns that may
require trusted post-processing to meet system objectives
as well as private requirements.
• There are enforcement aspects of governance that are
of considerable interest. Until now, the enforcement ap-
proach to SAS has been to emphasize ex ante, prophy-
lactic measures [40]. But it is likely that interference will
occur despite these measures, requiring ex post remedia-
tion. This will require a forensic capability to determine
the cause of the interference event and a remunerative
capability that is incentive compatible.29
• Implementing nested governance opens a set of chal-
lenges related to the synchronization and consistency of
distributed databases, especially if some of the databases
are subject to differing governance regimes. Lack of
synchronization may be one of the causes of interfer-
ence events, which should be considered in any forensic
analysis.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The rapid technological changes in the wireless industry
have driven substantial changes in system capabilities and cost,
and there is no reason to believe that this will change in the
foreseeable future. This almost certainly means that industry
structure will adapt and take on forms that are unforeseeable
today. Supporting many possible futures means having a SAS
that is adaptable to evolving governance approaches. We have
provided an example of what that might look like with a
prototype SAS.
The CPR literature is based on case studies from many
jurisdictions and socio-economic contexts. We use examples
from the U.S. in this paper because they were more easily
accessible to us, but it does not limit the applicability of the
ideas to this country. As well, we have focused on the spectrum
sharing systems that are of principal concern today, but that
does not limit the applicability of CPR-based approaches
to spectrum sharing either. For example, radio astronomy
requires quiet spaces, which could also be negotiated via CPR
approaches since they, too, are highly local in scope.
The literature on Common Pool Resources provides insight
into what features may be desirable under diverse sustainable
governance systems. We have argued that institutional and
various other ecological factors should be explicitly reflected
in the SAS design. Much remains to be worked out in terms
of the details of the enabling or facilitating mechanisms.
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